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We provide an overview of major developments in multi-and plurilateral trade agreements over the 20 years since the publication of
the first issue of EuroChoices, focusing on implications for agricultural and food markets. We take stock of accomplishments in market
integration, remaining obstacles to trade, events that have changed
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the trade landscape, and emerging issues. A working paper provides
sources for facts, figures and references (Beghin and O’Donnell, 2021).
Recent evolution of the World Trade Organization
The 23 countries that signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1947 accounted for roughly 60 per cent of global
trade and were evenly balanced between developed and developing
countries. By 2020, membership in the GATT’s successor, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), had expanded to 164 countries, with 24
new members since 2001 (including China and the Russian Federation) accounting for roughly 98 per cent of world trade. Two-thirds of
the members claim developing country status. The size and diversity
of the WTO –covering virtually the entire globe –coupled with shifts
in economic clout among the larger players, have resulted in major
pressures on the Organization.
The WTO operates through consensus, which has become increasingly difficult to achieve, especially as issues on the negotiating table
have become more complex. These include intellectual property, services trade and a raft of nontariff measures (NTMs) –many related to
food and agriculture. Some agreements in the Tokyo Round (1973–
1979) were negotiated by subsets of members on narrower topics,
informally called ‘codes’ since not all GATT members subscribed to
them. A similar approach is currently underway on e-commerce, services, domestic regulation and investment facilitation. Some WTO
members object to this approach.
The WTO’s capacity to manage increasingly complex policy agendas and structural issues has become stressed as we explain later
(e.g. the collapse of the WTO’s process for addressing trade disputes).
However, despite challenges, WTO membership remains attractive to
outsiders. Currently, 23 countries are in the accession process, with
many having applied over 15 years ago.
The failure of the Doha Round
In November 2001, the Doha Round of trade negotiations was
launched covering 20 trade topics, including remaining distortions
in agricultural markets, which had been reduced under commitments
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included in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)
in 1994. The URAA was the first WTO agreement specific to agricultural markets, a difficult area. The Round stalled for various reasons,
including divergent interests related to agriculture among negotiating members, e.g. opposition to market access for agricultural products in many developing countries and reticence to make further reductions in farm subsidies in OECD countries.
Despite this, there were some positive achievements for agriculture,
such as agreements on disciplines for export subsidies and related
measures, and trade facilitation procedures that govern the movement
of goods across borders. Several pivotal matters remain under discussion, such as the treatment of public stockholding, or are in limbo,
especially regarding agricultural support. Some countries have been
notoriously late in providing notifications of support required by the
URAA. Some developing economies are unwilling to dismantle their
complex agricultural price-support schemes. In addition, the proliferation of policies to address sustainability complicates the landscape
of agricultural support.
The lack of progress in the WTO is also caused by the growing importance of ‘beyond the border’ issues driven by the development of
global value chains. These issues include intellectual property rights,
investment codes and dispute settlement, which are often better addressed through Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). An expansion of
South–South trade through RTAs has decreased the South’s reliance
on North–South trade, reducing the importance of achieving progress on trade issues through the WTO. The WTO is currently not well
configured to tackle beyond the border issues.
A spaghetti bowl of regional and preferential trade agreements
Regional and preferential trade agreements have proliferated over
the past 20 years with 350 RTAs of various types in force in 2021. This
has been referred to as a ‘spaghetti bowl of RTAs’ given the potential for the emergence of heterogeneous and potentially discriminatory regulations. The expansionary trend started in the 1990s and has
consolidated over the last two decades, especially for Europe. Europe
integrated by enlarging the European Union from the EU-15 to the
current EU-27 (despite Brexit in 2021). Outward, the European Union
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has expanded RTAs with countries at its periphery (Albania and Serbia), and beyond (Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico and South Korea). Figure 1 summarizes the prevalence of regional agreements by region,
in which Europe is clearly an outlier.
A total of 261 RTAs were concluded over the last two decades, 90
per cent of which were free trade agreements (FTAs) through which
trade barriers, including agricultural ones, have been eliminated (or
substantially reduced) among members. Eight were customs union
agreements with common external tariffs and harmonization in such
areas as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations. A notable tendency in recent RTAs is the inclusion of a larger number of countries.
This mitigates spaghetti bowl concerns by rationalizing regulations
and taxes at the border for the larger number of countries entering
RTAs. One recent example is the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership involving 11 countries. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) introduced by the European Union
and the United States have removed duties on most imports, including agricultural and food imports from Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), many of them on the African continent. However, other policies, such as quality standards, are hard for many LDCs to meet, and
impede trade.
The spread of RTAs and PTAs has led to significant decreases in agricultural and food tariffs. To illustrate, in 2017 (the latest year of comprehensive coverage) agricultural preferential tariffs were 4.8 per cent
among RTA members (simple average) with nearly three quarters of
listed tariffs set to zero –this in the context of an average applied Most
Favored Nation (MFN) agricultural tariff of 15.8 per cent. Coalitions
of willing parties in RTAs based on existing trading relationships have
avoided the strait jacket of requiring consensus on multiple issues
through the WTO. Many RTAs have dispute resolution mechanisms,
which may substitute for the contested and now impaired mechanism
of the WTO (discussed below); though so far, these have not been
used. RTAs have been able to overcome some of the stumbling blocks
in the Doha Round negotiations, often motivated by organic trade activity and integration induced by geographical or cultural proximity
(e.g. Commonwealth of Independent States) or former colonial links
(e.g. Ghana and the United Kingdom). In conclusion, RTAs have largely
offset the lack of progress in the Doha Round negotiations.
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Figure 1 RTAs in force by region. Source: WTO Regional Trade Agreement database.

Agricultural trade remains distorted but applied tariffs have been
falling, and the number of tariff lines (i.e. listed tariffs) that are duty
free (i.e. have a zero tariff) has been increasing. To illustrate, the average applied MFN tariffs prevailing in key agri-food sectors of the
European Union and the United States –two major trade partners –
have fallen, although pockets of high tariffs remain in most sectors
(e.g. dairy) with some tariffs exceeding 100 per cent. Tariffs the European Union and the United States face as exporters have also fallen.
For example, using the three top partners, EU agricultural exports currently face simple average tariffs of 7.3 per cent in the United States,
12.5 per cent in China, and 25.7 per cent in Japan. US exports face
average tariffs of 21 per cent (Canada), 16.5 per cent (Mexico), and
24.7 per cent (Japan). In agriculture, 24 per cent of US tariff lines are
duty-free for EU exports and nearly 14 per cent of EU tariff lines are
duty-free for US exports. In contrast, more than 90 per cent of tariff
lines are duty-free in agricultural trade under the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA); and EU exports now benefit from
nearly half of tariff-lines being set to zero in Japan under the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.
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In addition to tariffs, many WTO members apply tariff-rate-quotas
(TRQs) to agricultural and food imports. TRQs are two-tier tariffs
around a fixed quota (import volume). Imports within the quota face
a small tariff; imports beyond the quota face a much higher (and often prohibitive) tariff. The European Union and the United States are
the largest users of TRQs –a legacy of former quota protection in food
markets. The European Union has 124 TRQs and the United States 54,
principally on meats, dairy products, grains and sugar. Complex allocation mechanisms create under-fill of the quotas in many TRQs.
Many RTAs go beyond simple market access measures and provide increased transparency for Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) (e.g. for
biotechnology approvals), provide reciprocity in SPS and Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures; and sometimes harmonization of
SPS regulations (e.g. Australia-New Zealand food safety regulations).
These NTM changes are harder to quantify. The evidence shows that
costs associated with agri-food NTMs are large but fall significantly
with RTAs. Addressing NTMs is important for participants in global
supply chains, who are often more concerned by beyond-the- border
regulations, e.g. investment regimes and intellectual property rights,
than by tariffs.
A bilateral agreement between the European Union and the United
States, as under the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in 2013, could reduce remaining duties and expand or
eliminate bilateral TRQs. TTIP negotiations were abandoned by the
Trump administration in 2016, partly because of difficulties in resolving EU-US differences in biotechnology approval processes, sciencebased versus precautionary SPS regulations such as hormone-treated
beef and chlorinated chicken, and geographic indications, which provide exclusive naming rights to producers in specific locations or for
specific production methods, such as for champagne or Parma ham.
Deep EU-US frictions on agricultural matters have persisted despite
intense negotiations during the Obama administration. Other issues,
such as the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, were also contentious but not centered on agriculture.
Despite the lack of multilateral progress in liberalizing agricultural
trade, the WTO was successful in strengthening disciplines on agricultural export subsidies through a December 2015 Ministerial Decision.
Developed members committed to eliminating all export subsidies
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The effectiveness of the WTO rests on the political will of its members to uphold
the system they created. © USDA

immediately, except for a few cases; developing members will phase
out their export subsidies by 2023. Progress on transparency and notifications has been tangible, although many countries are only partially fulfilling their obligations, such as providing ready access to information on NTMs, which disproportionally affect agricultural and
food trade.
Dark clouds over the WTO
Currently, each of the WTO’s three main pillars –dispute settlement,
negotiation and monitoring –face major pressures. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that resulted from the Uruguay Round
negotiations suffered a serious blow when its appeals function collapsed in late 2019 as a result of US objections to how it was operating. Beginning in 2016, the United States blocked the appointment of
judges to fill vacancies on the body that handled appeals until it could
no longer operate. The binding nature of the DSU and severe penalties
for non-compliance –unprecedented in the multilateral trading system –earned it the label of the ‘crown jewel’ of the WTO. The Dispute
Settlement process appears to be in limbo for the foreseeable future.
Members can still settle disputes through consultations or by
adopting the report of a panel assembled to consider a dispute. They
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can also use the trade-concern route within the SPS and TBT committees of the WTO before starting an official dispute consultation. Both
committees meet twice annually to hear members’ concerns. Out of
roughly 58,000 SPS and TBT notifications (as of March 2019), 1,020 led
to specific trade concerns, and out of these, 20 ended in full blown
disputes with DSU reports. For example, in 2001, the United States
raised a concern in the SPS Committee about the lack of a functioning approval process in the European Communities for agricultural
biotechnology products. This concern eventually devolved into three
separate disputes, all resolved through either the adoption of a DSU
report or through mutual agreement.
Roughly, two dozen WTO members, including the European
Union, have signed up to a workaround to the DSU failure called
the Multi-Party Interim Appeals Arbitration Agreement, although it
has yet to handle a case. There are other methods for dispute settlement, though none rest on the tradition, expertise and legitimacy
of the WTO. Many RTAs contain their own dispute settlement procedures, but countries seldom use them. Activating those mechanisms entails additional costs, whereas the cost of using WTO process is already covered through members’ annual contributions to
the WTO budget.
Recent unilateral actions challenge the future of the DSU and the
WTO more broadly. The Trump administration resorted to the unilateral imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum and on approximately US$ 370 billion worth of imports from China, effectively sidelining the WTO. The Biden administration has retained these tariffs
but announced in October 2021 that some imports of steel and aluminum from the EU will be allowed to enter the United States. The
WTO’s rules were intended to forestall unilateral increases in tariffs,
reserving trade retaliation only for when authorized through the
DSU. These unilateral developments remind us that the effectiveness
of the WTO rests on the political will of the members to uphold the
system they created.
Regarding challenges to its negotiating role, smaller trade deals
have proliferated outside the WTO, focusing on a narrow range of issues –sometimes called sectoral deals, mini-deals or phased deals. The
Trump administration concluded two high-profile mini deals: the USJapan Free Trade Agreement and the US-China Phase One deal. Both
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The WTO operates through consensus, which has become increasingly difficult to
achieve. © WTO

contained important agricultural provisions and both took effect without Congressional approval. Kathleen Claussen (2022) identifies more
than 1,200 such agreements (which she has termed ‘Trade Executive
Agreements’, or ‘TEAs’) in place between the United States and 130
countries, all concluded over the last 40 years. The Trump administration concluded 32 TEAs in 2020 alone. The scope of these deals varies
widely, from a single product to an entire sector. Since the Biden administration has made clear that comprehensive FTA negotiations are
not a priority, Claussen argues that this approach is likely to continue.
The GATT established requirements for notifications by members
to promote transparency. The maintenance of the multilateral trading system relies on a regular supply of accurate information about
domestic trade laws and policies. Transparency is important for assessing compliance with WTO agreements and for potentially avoiding disputes. As trade has grown more complex (e.g. the proliferation of NTMs), more topics fall within the WTO system, and there are
more requirements for notifications. More than 200 provisions in WTO
agreements currently require notifications, many of them for agricultural policies and trade.
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Compliance with notification requirements has fallen short. For example, in 2017, only 52 per cent of WTO members notified subsidies
in line with obligations under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For agriculture, about a third of regular notifications under the URAA are outstanding for the period 1995–2015. This
has given rise to proposals to encourage countries to increase compliance and to provide technical assistance to less developed countries
in meeting their commitments. This is an institutional issue weighing on the organization. Other substantive issues such as a controversial proposal to waive certain intellectual property commitments
to facilitate access to COVID-19 vaccines and a deal to curb fisheries
subsidies topped the agenda for the Ministerial Conference in November 2021. How far the WTO can go toward achieving substantive
outcomes on trade policy concerns without shoring up the important elements of its dispute settlement and transparency infrastructure is a key question.
The future role of the WTO in the agricultural trading system
We noted the evolution of agreements outside the WTO framework
with the growth of ‘mega-deal’ RTAs. Nevertheless, we see the WTO
as an essential component of the trading system, but not so much for
reaching ‘grand bargains’ through rounds of negotiations, such as the
Doha Round, which have been elusive. Rather, the WTO has an important function in the enforcement of current commitments. Its role
could also evolve into mediating RTAs and their consistency with multilateral obligations and in promoting transparency in RTAs.
The WTO could let parties solve trade disputes by using the dispute
settlement mechanisms established within their RTAs. Historically this
has not been the case, partly because of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. The use of that mechanism is no longer an option, but
the WTO could use other mechanisms to prevent disputes. As noted,
the SPS and TBT Committees have an important role in the discovery
of trade concerns and their resolution before full-blown dispute procedures are initiated. Other committees within the WTO discuss trade
frictions but do not have an established process to address them. This
could be addressed by replicating the special trade concern (STC) process for SPS and TBT measures. This process is important to signal
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The WTO could pursue a stronger monitoring role, going beyond its typical country
policy reviews to membership-wide assessment of conformity with existing agreements. © WTO.

issues and their importance, even though concerns may not be resolved. The slow speed of resolution of trade frictions remains a frustrating element of WTO procedures.
Finally, the WTO could pursue a stronger monitoring role, going
beyond its typical country policy reviews to membership-wide assessment of conformity with existing agreements. For example, the WTO
could provide systematic updates on conformity with agricultural subsidies notifications, and transparency commitments on SPS measures
(e.g. establishment of portals on regulations and their effectiveness).
In sum, we conjecture that the WTO will have to adjust to a world of
RTAs by focusing on increasing the transparency of RTAs and reporting
on their conformity with existing WTO agreements. The WTO can also
use existing tools to head off disputes, such as those through the SPS
and TBT committees, and extend this approach to other WTO committees. Beyond these incremental changes, a radical re-examination
of the architecture of trade rules and institutions may be required to
deal with the complex and evolving trade environment.
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Summaries

Trade Agreements in the Last 20 Years: Retrospect and Prospect for
Agriculture
We provide an overview of major developments in multi-and plurilateral
trade agreements over the last twenty years with a focus on the implications
for agricultural and food markets. We take stock of what has been accomplished in market integration, remaining obstacles to trade, events that have
changed the trade landscape, and emerging issues. Agricultural tariffs have
fallen through commitments made in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and through the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs).
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Nevertheless, agricultural trade remains distorted with some extremely high
tariffs. RTAs have achieved progress on nontariff measures and other beyond-the- border frictions. World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on
agricultural trade distortions have stalled because of their complexity and
divergent political interests among WTO members. In addition, the dispute
settlement mechanism no longer functions. The WTO will have to adjust to
a world of RTAs and use its tools and procedures to support the multilateral trading system by promoting increased transparency of RTAs and their
conformity with existing WTO agreements. The WTO can also use existing
tools to head off disputes using specific trade concern mechanisms, such as
those implemented through the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committees.
Les accords commerciaux au cours des 20 dernières années : rétrospective et perspectives pour l’agriculture
d’ensemble des principales évolutions dans les accords commerciaux multilatéraux et plurilatéraux au cours des vingt dernières années, en mettant l’accent sur les implications pour les marchés agricoles et alimentaires.
Nous faisons le point sur ce qui a été accompli en matière d’intégration des
marchés, les obstacles au commerce restant en place, les événements qui
ont modifié le paysage commercial et les problèmes émergents. Les tarifs
agricoles ont baissé du fait des engagements pris dans le cadre de l’Accord
du Cycle d’Uruguay sur l’agriculture et de la prolifération des accords commerciaux régionaux (ACR). Néanmoins, le commerce agricole reste faussé,
certains droits de douane demeurant extrêmement élevés. Les ACR ont permis de réaliser des progrès sur les mesures non tarifaires et d’autres frictions
au-delà des frontières. Les négociations à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) sur les distorsions des échanges agricoles sont au point mort
en raison de leur complexité et des intérêts politiques divergents parmi les
membres de l’OMC. De plus, le mécanisme de règlement des différends ne
fonctionne plus. L’OMC devra s’adapter à un monde d’ACR et utiliser ses outils et procédures pour soutenir le système commercial multilatéral en promouvant une transparence accrue des ACR et leur conformité avec les accords existants de l’OMC. L’OMC peut également utiliser les outils existants
pour éviter les différends en utilisant les mécanismes portant sur des questions commerciales spécifiques, tels que ceux mis en oeuvre par le biais des
comités pour les questions sanitaire et phytosanitaire (SPS) et les obstacles
techniques au commerce (OTC).
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Handelsabkommen in den letzten 20 Jahren: Rückblick und Ausblick
für die Landwirtschaft
Wir geben einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Entwicklungen bei multi-und
plurilateralen Handelsabkommen in den letzten zwanzig Jahren. Der Fokus
liegt dabei auf den Agrar-und Lebensmittelmärkten. Wir machen eine Bestandsaufnahme von dem, was bei der Marktintegration erreicht wurde, von
den verbleibenden Handelshemmnissen, von Ereignissen, die die Handelslandschaft verändert haben, und von neuen Problemen. Die Agrarzölle sind
durch die Beschlüsse der Uruguay-Runde und durch die zunehmende Anzahl an regionalen Handelsabkommen (RTAs) gesunken. Dennoch bleibt
der Agrarhandel mit einigen extrem hohen Zöllen verzerrt. Im Rahmen der
regionalen Handelsabkommen wurden Fortschritte bei nichttarifären Maßnahmen und anderen grenzüberschreitenden Spannungen erzielt. Die Verhandlungen der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) über Handelsverzerrungen
im Agrarbereich sind aufgrund ihrer Komplexität und der unterschiedlichen
politischen Interessen ihrer Mitglieder ins Stocken geraten. Darüber hinaus
funktioniert der WTO-Streitbeilegungsmechanismus nicht mehr. Die WTO
muss sich auf eine Welt mit regionalen Handelsabkommen einstellen. Und
sie muss ihre Instrumente und Verfahren einsetzen, um das multilaterale
Handelssystem zu unterstützen, indem sie eine größere Transparenz der regionalen Handelsabkommen und deren Übereinstimmung mit den bestehenden WTO-Übereinkommen fördert. Die WTO kann hierbei auch auf
bestehende Instrumente zurückgreifen, um Streitigkeiten mit Hilfe spezieller Mechanismen für Handelsfragen abzuwenden. Als Beispiele können die
Ausschüsse für gesundheitliche und pflanzenschutzrechtliche Maßnahmen
(SPS) und technische Handelshemmnisse (TBT) genannt werden.

